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DNA-INSPIRED INFORMATION CONCEALING
LUKAS KENCL AND MARTIN LOEBL
Abstract. Protection of the sensitive content is crucial for extensive information sharing. We present a
technique of information concealing, based on introduction and maintenance of families of repeats. Repeats
in DNA constitute a basic obstacle for its reconstruction by hybridisation. Information concealing in DNA
by repeats is considered in [1].
1. Introduction
Contemporary computer systems may be distributed and may consist of many interconnected processing
units or a large number of networked computer subsystems. In addition contemporary digital networks may
consist of a large number of end- and intermediate- nodes. In all these systems, information, in the form
of the sequences over some alphabet of symbols, is circulating or being stored. The entity controlling a
subsystem or a node is often unwilling or prohibited to share this information-sequences with other nodes.
However, sharing of some reduced local information might be very useful for purposes of security, stability
and various analysis of the system performance, and for data mining. Such analysis might for example
allow to identify frequently appearing segments by performing approximate statistical analysis on segment
frequency, allowing to detect replicating malicious code-worms. It also allows to identify segments-markers
of computer viral infection, by detecting patterns existing in some database of malicious sequences. Such
databases are used e.g. in contemporary intrusion detection systems or spam filters. It has been shown that
being able to perform pattern matching against only fixed-length prefixes or substrings of longer sequences
can provide approximate hints as to the presence of suspicious content [2]. Likewise, established worm
detection techniques such as Autograph [3] or EarlyBird [4] are based on counting frequency of small blocks
of a fixed size.
Sharing of reduced local information among the members of an interconnected computer system or com-
munication network thus helps to discover attacks earlier. Affected parts may be isolated and further attack
spread prevented. The benefits of sharing local information may be reaped in case of existence of a com-
putational information processing, which preserves local information (e.g. all segments of certain maximal
length) and makes impossible to reconstruct longer or sensitive parts of the information sequences.
We call such information processing concealing. The systems which conceal information and share the
concealed information are likely to possess a competative advantage in the form of robustness, attack resis-
tance and immunity due to ability to exchange, publish and protect information. Clearly, any information
concealing algorithm needs to address two conflicting goals:
(1) preserving presence and, possibly, frequency rank of segments of given size (making spam identifica-
tion and worm detection still possible), while
(2) making reconstruction of content longer than the predefined limit computationally hard (e.g. dis-
abling interpretation or understanding of the private content).
1.1. Main contribution. The main contribution of this paper is
• Formulation of the information concealing problem
• Presentation of an information concealing algorithm
• Analysis of the algorithm and a proof of the hardness of reconstruction of the input sequence
M. Loebl is with the Department of Applied Mathematics and Institute of Theoretical Informatics (ITI), Charles University,
Prague, Czech Republic.
L. Kencl is with the Research and Development Centre (RDC), Czech Technical University, Prague, Czech Republic.
1
2. Related Work
2.1. Repeats in DNA. Our inspiration comes from an important feature of eukaryotic DNA, namely that
it contains various repeat families, and that their presence constitutes a basic difficulty in DNA reconstruction
by hybridisation [6].
A large proportion of eukaryotic genomes is composed of DNA segments that are repeated either precisely
or in variant form more than once. Highly repeated segments are arranged in two ways: as tandem arrays
or dispersed among many unlinked genomic locations. As yet, no function has been associated with many of
the repeats [8]. In the paper [1] which accompanies this paper, the authors propose that in eukaryotes the
cells have DNA as a depositary of concealed genetic information and the genome achieves the self-concealing
by accumulation and maintenance of repeats. The protected information may be shared and this is useful
for the development of intercellular communication and in the development of multicellular organisms.
The assertion that the repeats are maintained in DNA in a programmed way for self-concealing explains
basic puzzling features of repeats: the uniformity along with the polymorphism of the repeated sequences; the
freedom of the repeated DNA to adopt quite different primary sequences in closely related species; apparent
non-functionality of the precise amount or the precise sequence of the repeats.
The containment of repeats versus DNA sequencing problem is receiving extensive attention of biologists,
computer scientists and mathematicians (see [5], [6], [7]).
2.2. Repeats versus DNA reconstruction. We explain the basic idea of concealing by repeats in this
subsection. Assume we are given a collection K of segments of DNA. Each segment S from K is divided into
two parts, the initial part S(I) and the terminal part S(T ). We thus may write S = S(I)|S(T ). This is an
artificial assumption imposed only for the clarity of the presentation.
A reconstruction of K is a sequence of its segments so that the terminal part of each segment agrees with
the initial part of next segment in the sequence. If several of these initial and terminal parts coincide, there
may be an exponential number of possible reconstructions.
Let us consider a very simple example. Let K be the following collection of segments, where the initial
and the terminal parts are divided by the vertical line:
A|B,B|A,A|C,C|A,B|C,C|B.
the following sequences are some of the possible reconstructions:
ABACBCA,ACABCBA,BACABCB,ABCACBA.
In this simple example, even unlimited computational power is useless to anybody who wants to obtain the
correct reconstruction from the many possible reconstructions. This phenomenon may well be described in
terms of the de Bruin graph: this graph has a node for each segment which is an initial or a terminal part
of an element of K. For each segment S of K there is an arrow (a directed edge) from S(I) to S(T ).
A
B
C
Figure 1. De Bruin graph for K
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The possible reconstructions now correspond to the walks on the de Bruin graph so that each directed edge
is traversed exactly once. These walks are usually called Euler walks. If a node of the de Bruin graph has
more than one outgoing incident directed edge, then locally there are several independent ways to traverse
these edges. The number of the Euler walks of the de Bruin graph is therefore typically exponential in the
number of these nodes (see [7] for the calculations).
2.3. Concealing in Information and Communication Technologies. The concept of hiding private or
sensitive data but preserving some form of structural information has been studied recently in various sub-
domains of ICT. Some techniques concentrate on hiding the originator of information, i.e. anonynimization,
other focus on enabling particular functions over the data that can be shared among multiple partners, such
as private matching.
2.3.1. Concealing Network Data. An anonymization scheme over the network packet IP addresses called
CryptoPan [11] preserves the prefix hierarchy of the original addresses, while making them computationally
hard to reconstruct by using hashing. This in turn allows to share network traces (with packet headers only),
with preservation of the prefix hierarchy.
Similarly, in [12], structure of the router configuration files and data is preserved, while the actual values
are obfuscated.
A technique to process and transform the network packet payload has been proposed in [13]. This method
uses dictionaries of important sequences that are valuable from the data mining perspective and should be
preserved, while encrypting the rest of the information with cryptographically strong hash function. This
technique performs well in terms of data protection, however, it only allows to study content portions pre-
determined by a known list, and thus does not allow to study the payload to detect previously unknown
content, such as e.g. malicious subsequence.
The popular Bloom filter [14] approach is used in constructing the Hierarchical Bloom Filter payload
attribution technique [15]. A Bloom filter can store (incompletely but efficiently) input items (which can
be substrings) and easily answer set membership queries. It consists of k hash functions, each associating
one of m numbers to each input item. Set membership queries exhibit no false negatives, but can have false
positives.
Payload attribution with a Hierarchical Bloom Filter stores segments of network packet payloads with
their IP source and destination addresses. Each payload is cut into segments s1, . . . , sn. The si’s are stored
in a Bloom filter of level 0, the pairs s1s2, s3s4, . . . in Bloom filter of level 1, quadruples in level 2, and so on.
A query on an excerpt of payload, which may consist of several consecutive blocks, may answer the source
and destination address by running through consecutive hierarchy levels.
The authors propose deployment at network concentration points. Privacy protection is to be achieved
by restricting access of entities that can pose queries, otherwise exhaustive attacks might lead to payload
reconstruction.
2.3.2. Private matching. Private matching [16, 17] focuses on the problem of two entities trying to find
common data elements in their databases, without revealing private information. The basic property (and
difference to the general information concealing problem) is that only two parties are involved; a multi-
party solution is a future work suggestion. Further problems are asymmetry in the sequence of information
exchange among the parties and needed presumption of honesty (’semihonesty’ in the paper).
Private matching is a special case of cryptography theory of multi-party computation: m parties want to
compute function f on their m inputs. In the ideal model, where a trusted party exists, the parties give
their inputs to the trusted authority, it calculates f , and returns the result to each party. The ideal model
assumes an ideal situation: for example, no protocol can prevent a party to change its input before the
communication is started. A secure multiparty computation protocol emulates what happens in the ideal
model.
Paper [16] also introduces ’data ownership certificates’ to modify the private matching protocols to be
unspoofable. This technique is shown to be useful in a more practical setting to enable privacy-protecting
sharing of e-mail white-lists in [18].
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2.3.3. Data Masking. Various techniques of masking, sanitizing and obfuscating data have been studied
to enable test- or third-party development over sensitive databases (such as the Human Resources data).
After sanitization, the database remains usable - the look-and-feel and some relations and distributions
are preserved - but the information content is secure. The used techniques include masking, shuffling,
substitution, number-variance, encryption etc [19]. These techniques share a similar goal with information
concealing, but focus on structured data without the need of preserving the local information.
2.3.4. Data Mining and Anonymization. In data mining, anonymization mechanisms (obfuscating the origi-
nator or the private part of the data) are currently studied intensively. Privacy mechanisms can be classified
into several categories, according to where they are deployed during the life cycle of the data. The mecha-
nism proposed in this paper falls into the category where the individuals trust no one but themselves, and
they conceal their respective data before they make them available for sharing. The existing algorithms in
this category [20, 21, 22, 23, 24] are called local perturbation; they are based on different ideas then the
concealing procedure proposed in this letter.
In another category, data publishing, data are anonymized at a central server; the individuals are required
to trust this server [25]. Anonymization in social networks is studied in [26].
An important theoretical foundation for data anonymity and originator protection was laid in [29]. The
k-anonymity model for protecting privacy allows holders to release their private data without being distin-
guishable from at least k-1 other individuals also in the release.
2.3.5. Steganography. This form of information hiding [27, 28] is a related art and science of writing hidden
messages in such a way that no one apart from the sender and intended recipient realizes there is a hidden
message; this nowadays includes concealment of digital information within computer files. Comparably,
steganalysis is the art of detecting the hidden information.
Steganography is a mature science, in particular focussing on the domain of Digital Rights Management
(DRM), where various ’watermarking’ or ’tamper-proofing’ techniques may seamlessly embed extra informa-
tion about the origin of a digital work within itself. This is a different goal than the proposed information
concealing. While the embedded information may be well concealed and thus very hard to reconstruct,
data mining of such information would not be generally possible. However, it would be very interesting to
apply the steganalysis tools to the information concealing ’attacker problem’ (see Section 3) and it certainly
belongs among our future work.
2.3.6. Information Retrieval. The ”attacker problem” of concealed string reconstruction (see Section 3) has
a strong connection to the problem of information retrieval [30], where probabilistic information about the
expected string (e.g. natural text) may be used to derive further information or assist text reconstruction.
2.4. Segments shuffling. Finally we mention that our first attempt to solve the anonymization problem [31]
was using random permutations of a collection of short overlapping segments. This method however by itself
doesnot lead to concealing the original data information. It is shown in this paper that in order to sufficiently
extend the families of repeats of the resulting sequence and make the concealing successful, other procedures
need to be performed as well. In particular the overlapping segments containing complete local information
need to be prolonged by attaching additional short segments to their beginning and/or their end. The
shuffling permutation also needs to satisfy some properties. This is described in the rest of the paper.
3. Information Concealing Problem
We introduce formally the information-sequence concealing problem. Let |ω| denote the number of symbols
(length) of sequence ω. The sequence concealing problem is the following: Given a sequence ω and a small
positive integer k, we want to transform ω to another sequence ωF so that:
I.- If s is a segment of ω with |s| ≤ k, then s is a segment of ωF .
II.- It is computationally hard to reconstruct sequence ω from ωF .
III.- The length of ωF is linear in |ω|.
IV.- It is also desirable that with low probability, a segment not in ω appears in ωF , and that relative
frequency (i.e., frequency rank) of segments of ω of a given length is preserved in ωF . The precise
statement of these two conditions is however strongly application dependent.
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Given the statement of the information concealing problem, the key issue is how much information about
ω can an attacker deduce from ωF ; let us call this issue the attacker problem.
Clearly, the answer to the attacker problem is application-dependent. If the input sequence ω is very
restrictive, e.g. if a short prefix uniquely determines larger part of ω and the k-segments of ω may be
distinguished within the larger k-segment superset of ωF , then inevitably large part of input ω may be
reconstructed from ωF . In quite a number of practical situations (DNA sequence, computer program, sound
and video trace, text on non-specific topic), however, this is not the case. Moreover, for restrictive input
sequences, we can perform preparatory procedures (as procedure S described below) which make the input
sequence less specific.
This partly justifies the following consistency assumption concerning the attacker problem which we need
to make in order to carry the security analysis of the concealing algorithm.
Proposition 3.1. The complete input of the attacker problem, i.e. all the useful information an attacker
has about ω, is ωF , the length |ω|, the length k of the preserved segments and the concealing algorithm used
in obtaining ωF .
Thus, an attacker may use the list of frequencies of repeats of segments of ωF along with the knowledge
of the concealing algorithm to attempt the reconstruction of ω.
4. Concealing by repeats
The input of the problem is a sequence over an alphabet. We first turn it into a cyclic sequence by
connecting its beginning and end.
Next we describe five procedures which are used in the algorithm. The basic pattern of all the procedures
is the same and may be described as follows: the input is a cyclic sequence ω. First, ω is partitioned into
consecutive disjoint blocks. Then the terminal part of the preceding block of length o (the overlap) is added
in front of each block. The resulting segments contain all the studied local information; depending on the
procedure, these segments will also contain some excess information which is vital in a proposed composition
of the procedures which forms our concealing algorithm. Next, a segment called dust can but neednot be
added behind each segment. The enhanced blocks are called the cards. The last step consists in arranging
the cards into the output cyclic sequence ωF .
The first procedure S has a preparatory character in the concealing algorithm. Several runs of S have the
role of breaking the local sequential order in the input sequence.
4.1. Procedure S(ω, o, lb, ub). Its input is a cyclic sequence ω, and it has parameters o, lb, ub; o stands for
the size of the overlap, lb is for lower bound of the length of a block, and ub is for the upper bound of the
length of a block. The procedure S(ω, o, lb, ub) is defined by 1.-4. below.
1. We partition (sometimes we say that we cut) ω into consecutive disjoint blocks P1, . . . , Pm such that
the length of each Pi is chosen at random between lb, ub.
2. We add overlap of length o in front of each block. The overlapping segments thus contain all the
original sub-segments of length up to o+ 1.
3. The blocks enhanced by the overlaps now start and end with the corresponding overlaps. If these
were arranged into a cyclic sequence, the overlaps would neighbor. This may help an attacker in
reconstruction. To break the neighborhood relationship of the overlaps, we may add dust (a randomly
chosen segment) behind each block. Adding dust is optional and application dependent. A natural
restriction is that the dust is a segment of the input sequence and that the average length of dust is
1/2(lb+ ub)− o to match the average length of the segments complementing the overlaps. However,
depending on applications, and the stringency of condition [IV ] of the sequence concealing problem,
length of dust may be different and the dust need not be a segment of the input sequence.
4. We arrange the resulting cards randomly into a cyclic sequence.
As an illustration we perform S on an example input sequence:
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Example 1: Procedure S(ω, o, lb, ub)
Input ω = ’the aim of this paper is to present an information concealing algorithm’, parameters
o = 3, lb = 4, ub = 6.
1. First, the input sequence is partitioned randomly into blocks of length 4, 5 or 6. The blocks are
divided by ’+’ below:
’the ai+m of t+his +pape+r is +to pr+esent+ an i+nfor+matio+n co+ncea+ling
+algor+ ithm+’
2. Next we add overlap (of length o = k − 1 = 3) in front of each block:
’thmthe ai+ aim of t+f this +is pape+aper is +is to pr+ present+ent an i+n
infor+formati+tion co+ concea+cealing +ingalgor+gorithm+’
3. Next we add the dust behind each block (of length approximately 2), and we get the cards:
’thmthe aip+ aim of tim+f this con+is pape in+aper is a+is to pro p+ presentese+ent
an ilgo+n infori +formatifo+tion co + concea ci+cealing pa+ingalgor p+gorithmap+’
4. Finally the output is given by arranging the cards in a random order (here we use the order
14, 9, 10, 13, 5, 3, 12, 1, 6, 4, 7, 11, 8, 15, 2):
’ingalgor pn infori formatifocealing paaper is af this conconcea cithmthe aipis to pro
pis pape in presentesetion co ent an ilgogorithmap aim of tim’
4.2. Procedure S1(ω, lb, ub). Procedure S1(ω, lb, ub) is as S but the overlap is always the whole preceding
block - typically exceeding the size needed to preserve the studied local information (this excess is used in
the composition of the procedures forming our concealing algorithm). Hence, if the blocks are
ω = P1P2P3 . . . Pm,
then the cards of S1 are P1P2, P2P3, . . . , PmP1.
Each Pi appears once as initial segment and once as terminal segment of each card. Hence, the cyclic
consecutive order of the cards of S1 may be described by a permutation pi of 1, . . . ,m; for further discussions
it turns out useful to define such permutation so that it assigns, to each terminal block of a card, the initial
block of the next card. By permutation of 1, . . . ,m we mean a bijection from set {1, . . . ,m} onto itself. If pi
is a permutation then pi−1 denotes the inverse permutation (pi(x) = y if and only if pi−1(y) = x). Hence, in
our formalism, card Pi−1Pi is followed by card Ppi(i)Ppi(i)+1.
The output of S1 thus always has form
P1P2Ppi(2)Ppi(2)+1 . . . Ppi−1(1)−1Ppi−1(1).
For instance, if we have m = 3 then the cards are P1P2, P2P3, P3P1 and a shuffling which results in sequence
P1P2P3P1P2P3 is described by permutation pi(1) = 2, pi(2) = 3, pi(3) = 1.
4.2.1. Acceptable permutations. For our purposes, not all permutations pi are acceptable; let us formally
denote by A the set of all the acceptable permutations. To define A, we first introduce an auxiliary bipartite
graph G(pi).
Definition 4.1. Graph G(pi) has vertex-set V = V1 ∪ V2 where V1 = {u1, . . . , um} and V2 = {v1, . . . , vm}.
The edge-set of G(pi) is the union of three disjoint perfect matchings of the vertex-set, namely:
1. The perfect matching M1 consisting of the edges {ui, vi}.
2. The perfect matching M2 consisting of the edges {ui+1, vi}.
3. The perfect matching M3 consisting of the edges {upi(i), vi}.
Definition 4.2. We construct a directed graph G′(pi) from G(pi) by first directing each edge of M2 ∪M3
from V2 to V1, and then contracting each edge of M1.
Definition 4.3. (of set A of all acceptable permutations ) Permutation pi is acceptable (pi ∈ A) if and only
if the following two conditions are satisfied:
1. The directed graphG′(pi) has a directed eulerian closed walk where the edges ofM2 andM3 alternate.
This condition is equivalent to saying that permutation pi describes a rearrangement of the cards of
S1 into a sequence.
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2. In the auxiliary graph G(pi), the union of the perfect matchingsM2∪M3 contains many (at leastm/c
where c ≥ 2 is a small constant) cycles. This condition is added in order to make the reconstruction
of the input sequence hard; see the sections below.
The following observation about the graph G(pi) will be used in the analysis of the attacker problem.
Observation 4.4. Let G(pi) be as in Definition 4.1. For vi ∈ V2 let s(v) = Pi be its associated segment.
Then we have the following equality between cyclic sequences:
P1P2P3 . . . Pm = s(M2(1))s(M2(2)) . . . s(M2(m)),
where M2(i) denotes the vertex of V2 connected with ui ∈ V1 by an edge of M2.
For illustration we perform S1 on the output sequence of the previous example (which would be the
natural use of S1, as described later):
Example 2: Procedure S1(ω, lb, ub)
Input ω = ’ingalgor pn infori formatifocealing paaper is af this conconcea cithmthe aipis to
pro pis pape in presentesetion co ent an ilgogorithmap aim of tim’, parameters lb = 6 and
ub = 8.
First, the input sequence is partitioned randomly into blocks of length 6, 7 or 8. The blocks are divided
by ’+’ below:
’ingalgo+r pn inf+ori for+matifo+cealing+ paape+r is a+f this c+onconce+a cithm+the
aipi+s to pro+ pis p+ape in+ present+esetion +co ent +an ilg+ogorith+map ai+m of
tim+’
Next we add overlap in front of each block. For procedure S1 the overlap is always the whole preceding
block. We get the following cards; to make the example easier to understand we indicate by ’*’ the
division of each card into two blocks:
’m of tim*ingalgo+ingalgo*r pn inf+r pn inf*ori for+ori
for*matifo+matifo*cealing+cealing* paape+ paape*r is a+r is a*f this c+f this
c*onconce+onconce*a cithm+a cithm*the aipi+the aipi*s to pro+s to pro* pis p+
pis p*ape in+ape in* present+ present*esetion +esetion *co ent +co ent *an ilg+an
ilg*ogorith+ogorith*map ai+map ai*m of tim+’
Finally the output is given by rearranging the cards by an acceptable permutation, i.e. by a permutation
whose corresponding bipartite graph consists of a lot of cycles. The smallest length of a cycle is 4. It
is not difficult to see that the following permutation pi creates nine 4−cycles and one 6 − cycle. In the
following description of pi, the cycles are grouped together; for instance the first 4−cycle has edges
(v1, u10), (v9, u2), (v1, u2), (v9, u10). The first two of them belong to perfect matching M3, the last two
belong to perfect matching M2.
[pi(1) = 10, pi(9) = 2]; [pi(2) = 6, pi(5) = 3]; [pi(3) = 9, pi(8) = 4]; [pi(7) = 13, pi(12) = 8]; [pi(14) =
11, pi(10) = 15]; [pi(11) = 18, pi(17) = 12]; [pi(19) = 14, pi(13) = 20]; [pi(16) = 21, pi(20) = 17]; [pi(15) =
19, pi(18) = 16]; [pi(21) = 7, pi(4) = 5, pi(6) = 1].
Hence the final sequence (for ease of understanding we preserve the separation symbols ’*’, which in
reality would not be present):.
’ingalgo*r pn inf paape*r is a pis p*ape inthe aipi*s to prof this c*onconcer pn inf*ori
foronconce*a cithm present*esetion m of tim*ingalgoa cithm*the aipian ilg*ogorithape
in* presentogorith*map aico ent *an ilgesetion *co ent s to pro* pis pmap ai*m of timr is
a*f this cmatifo*cealingori for*matifocealing* paape’
4.3. Procedure S1+(ω, lb, ub). If the input of the procedure S1 comes from several runs of the preparatory
procedure S described above, then we need to modify S1 in order to make its output generic, that is to
intentionally preserve the attacker-confusing overlaps. This modified procedure is called S1+.
We recall that S1 repeats the whole blocks Pi, i.e. the output of S
1 is the cyclic sequence
P1P2Ppi(2)Ppi(2)+1 . . . Ppi−1(1)−1Ppi−1(1).
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We assume that the input ω of S1+ comes from repeated runs of procedure S and so ω contains a lot of
segments of length o (the overlaps of runs of S) repeated at least twice; let us denote by R the set of all
these segments.
Procedure S1+ starts as S1 by partitioning of ω into blocks
P1, P2, . . . , Pm.
The blocks of S1+ cut some of the segments from R. To reflect this, we write Pi = r
T
i−1Qir
I
i where
• Segment rTi−1 is an empty segment or a terminal segment of an element of R cut by the partition
between blocks Pi−1 and Pi.
• Segment rIi is an empty segment or an initial segment of an element of R cut by the partition between
blocks Pi and Pi+1.
Summarizing this notation we write
P1P2 . . . Pm = Q1r1Q2r2Q3r3 . . . rm−1Qmrm,
where each ri is such an element of R that is cut by the blocks of S
1+, or an empty segment. Each
Pi = r
T
i−1Qir
I
i where ri = r
I
i r
T
i .
The first difference of S1 and S1+ is that the overlaps of S1+ are not the whole preceding blocks. Instead,
the overlap added in front of block Pi+1 is Qir
I
i . Hence, block Pi+1 with the overlap added in front of it has
form QiriQi+1r
I
i+1.
To make the cards of S1+ more generic (see the same step in the description of Procedure S), we change
each such QiriQi+1r
I
i+1 into QiriQi+1r
′
i+1 where r
′
i+1 is obtained from r
I
i+1 by adding a segment so that
r′i+1 has length o and is repeated elsewhere in ω.
Summarising, the output of S1+ has form
Q1 ∗Q2 ∗Qpi(2) ∗Qpi(2)+1 ∗ . . . ∗Qpi−1(1)−1 ∗Qpi−1(1)∗,
where each ∗ stands for a segment of length o which is repeated (at least) twice in this output, or the empty
string. More specifically, if ∗ follows segment Qi then it is equal to ri or to r
′
i.
4.4. Procedure S2(ω, o). Let S2(ω, o) be as follows: we assume its input is an output of S1, i.e. it is the
cyclic sequence
P1P2Ppi(2)Ppi(2)+1 . . . Ppi−1(1)−1Ppi−1(1).
Note that in this sequence, each block Pi appears twice. Procedure S
2 first cuts each Pi randomly into P
1
i , P
2
i
so that length of P 1i is at least o, i.e. the whole overlap of length o, which we denote by oi, is contained in
P 1i . The trick of the concealing algorithm is that both copies of each Pi are cut in the same way! Let oiP
2
i
denote P 2i with the added overlap.
For example, if Pi is equal to ’abcdefghijkl’ and o = 3 then a possible cut of S
2 is ’abcde+fghijkl’; P 1i is
equal to ’abcde’, P 2i is equal to ’fghijkl’ and oiP
2
i is equal to ’cdefghijkl’.
We may describe the set of the cards of S2 as the disjoint union of two sets C1 ∪ C2, where
C1 = {o1P
2
1P
1
2 , o2P
2
2 P
1
3 , . . . , omP
2
mP
1
1 }
and
C2 = {o1P
2
1P
1
pi(1), o2P
2
2P
1
pi(2), . . . , omP
2
mP
1
pi(m)}.
We remark here that the cards of C1 correspond to the edges of perfect matching M2 of graph G(pi) and
the cards of C2 correspond to the edges of perfect matching M3 of G(pi) (see Definition 4.1).
Finally S2 arranges C1 ∪ C2 into a random cyclic sequence.
For illustration we perform S2 on the output sequence of the previous example 2 (which would be the
natural use of S2, as described later):
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Example 3: Procedure S2(ω, o)
Input ω = ’ingalgo*r pn inf paape*r is a pis p*ape inthe aipi*s to prof this c*onconcer
pn inf*ori foronconce*a cithm present*esetion m of tim*ingalgoa cithm*the aipian
ilg*ogorithape in* presentogorith*map aico ent *an ilgesetion *co ent s to pro* pis pmap
ai*m of timr is a*f this cmatifo*cealingori for*matifocealing* paape’, parameter o = 3.
A consistent partitioning into blocks is indicated below:
’inga+lgo*r pn i+nf pa+ape*r is+ a pis+ p*ape+ inthe a+ipi*s to +prof this +c*onco+ncer
pn i+nf*ori+ foronco+nce*a ci+thm pre+sent*eseti+on m of +tim*inga+lgoa ci+thm*the
a+ipian i+lg*ogori+thape+ in* pre+sentogori+th*map +aico e+nt *an i+lgeseti+on *co
e+nt s to +pro* pis+ pmap +ai*m of +timr is+ a*f this +cmati+fo*ceal+ingori+
for*mati+foceal+ing* pa+ape’
Next we add overlap (of length o) in front of each block (and we delete the ’helpful symbol’ *):
’apeinga+ngalgor pn i+n inf pa+ paaper is+ is a pis+pis pape+ape inthe a+e
aipis to +to prof this +is conco+nconcer pn i+n infori+ori foronco+nconcea ci+
cithm pre+presenteseti+etion m of +of timinga+ngalgoa ci+ cithmthe a+e aipian
i+n ilgogori+orithape+ape in pre+presentogori+orithmap +ap aico e+o ent an i+n
ilgeseti+etion co e+o ent to +to pro pis+pis pmap +ap aim of +of timr is+ is af this
+is cmati+atifoceal+ealingori+ori formati+atifoceal+ealing pa+ paape’
Finally we rearrange the cards in a random order. The resulting sequence is as follows:
’n inforio ent s to ori formati paapen ilgesetipis papen ilgogoringalgor pn iapeingaof timr
is is af this presentesetin inf paealingoriealing papresentogorietion m of atifocealap aim of
ngalgoa cie aipisan iof timingaatifocealis cmatipis pmap orithapeis concoori foroncoto pro
pise aipis to paaper isnconcer pn ietion co e is a pis cithm preo ent an ito prof this nconcea
ciap aico eape inthe aorithmap cithmthe aape in pre’
4.5. Procedure S2+(ω, o). We assume its input is an output of S1+. This procedure is defined analogously
as S2 with the only difference that the cuts are performed to segments Qi instead of segments Pi.
5. The concealing algorithm
Let the input string be ω, and the length of the preserved segments be k. We consider two scenarios, weak
concealing and strong concealing, depending on the nature of the input. We perform the weak concealing
algorithm if the input is nonspecific, i.e., short segments have many possible alternative prolongations, or
there does not exist any outside knowledge about the likelihood of presence of some segments in the input
(e.g. an English text).
The weak concealing algorithm may be described as
ωF = S
2(S1(ω, 3k/2, 2k), k− 1).
We choose to have the block length in S1 longer and to overlap the whole blocks in S1 since we want to
ensure that the cuts of S2 may be done in the same way in each of the two copies of the blocks Pi.
The strong concealing algorithm may be written as
ωF = S
2+(S1+(S . . . S(ω, k − 1, k, 3k/2))), 3k/2, 2k), k− 1),
where the number of repetitions of procedure S is application specific.
6. Analysis of the concealing algorithm
Observation 6.1. The concealing algorithm preserves all segments of length k present in the input sequence
ω within the output sequence ωF .
This observation is straightforward as whenever any of the above procedures cuts the input string, an
overlap of length at least k − 1 is added in front of the segment following the cut, thus preserving all
subsegments of length k which would otherwise be partitioned by the cut.
It is also straightforward that both weak and strong concealing algorithms are linear in |ω| if we have
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• Access to a generator of random permutations of the numbers less than |ω|,
• Access to a generator of random elements of A (see Definition 4.3).
A random permutation may be generated in linear time (see [9]). We will not discuss the complexity of
generating random elements of A. Instead, we specify a large subset B of A such that generating a random
element of B may be reduced to generating a random permutation of a number less than |ω|.
Each element of B may be constructed as follows: we take any permutation pi of m/2 (we assume m is
even) and we consider the pairing P (pi) of {1, 2, . . .m} given by (1, pi(1) +m/2), . . . (m/2, pi(m/2) +m/2).
This pairing may be looked at as an involution i(pi) (a permutation α is involution if α(α(x)) = x for each
x) on m. Finally, we get element β = β(pi) of B by shifting i(pi) by 1, i.e., by letting β(a) = i(pi)(a) + 1
modulo m; we have an additional condition that Oj(1) 6= 1 for j < m and O(a) = β(a) + 1. This condition
makes sure that the first condition of the definition of the acceptable permutation is satisfied. The following
observation is straightforward.
Observation 6.2.
|B| ≤ (m/2− 1)!
Further, the graphs defined by a permutation from B are disjoint unions of m/2 cycles of length 4. Generating
a random element from B is as hard as choosing a random permutation of m/2.
The following observation is also straightforward.
Observation 6.3. The length of the output of each of the procedures applied to input ω is linear in |ω|. For
example, for S and S1 it is 2|ω|.
7. Hardness of the attacker problem
We recall that the attacker problem introduced in Section 3 (see also Proposition 3.1) reads:
How much information about ω can an attacker deduce from ωF , |ω|, k and the knowledge of the concealing
algorithm?
For instance, the attacker can try to get all the overlaps of S2 since assuming ωF has no accidental repeats
these overlaps appear exactly four times in ωF and no other segment is like that. The attacker may partition
ωF into cards as indicated by all these overlaps. She gets a collection of cards, with (k− 1)-length segments
marked in the beginning and the end of each card. The attacker wants to overlap these marked segments.
Depending on whether ωF has accidental repeats, the attacker possibly cuts in more places than were the
original cards used in the algorithm. Hence, in her collection of cards some overlaps should not have been
considered, and some segments have overlaps with more than one other card. These considerations naturally
specify the domino and donkey problems.
In more realistic situation the attacker does not know the correct list of cards of S2 and hence she needs
to choose which 4−repeats to ignore. We may assume that she has some hints as to which overlaps are
’likely’ ok. This is the situation we model by the following problem.
Shortest domino row problem (SDRP). Assume we are given a collection of dominoes (domino will
mean a rectangle partitioned vertically into two squares, where one is initial and the other one is terminal),
and we are also given a graph on the squares. This graph should be interpreted as the graph of hints. We
want to put all the dominoes into a row, so that if two consecutive squares are connected by an edge of the
graph, we can put one square on top of the other (i.e., identify them). The aim is to make the resulting row
as short as possible, i.e. to satisfy as many hints as possible.
Let us define the (de Bruijn-type) graph G = (V,E) where V is the set of all the squares, and E is the set
of the dominoes: edge ei connects the squares of domino Qi. The following observation is straightforward.
Observation 7.1. There is a natural bijection between the set of the Euler circuits (eulerian closed walks)
of G and the set of all the circular sequences consistent with the overlapping dominoes Q1, . . . , Qm.
Theorem 1. The SDRP is search-NP-complete.
Proof. Assume that in the auxiliary graph, there is edge between two squares if they are equal, but not all
such edges are there. This is exactly consistent with our interpretation. Now, in the reformulation with the
de Bruijn graph and the Euler circuit, this corresponds to the problem that we are given a graph, with some
transitions between neighboring edges recommended, and we want to find an Euler circuit with as many
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recommended transitions as possible. A particular instance is that some transitions are forbidden, and we
want to find out whether Euler circuit where all the transitions are allowed exists. This is known to be NP
complete ([10]).
We have in fact a search instance of this problem: we know that such an Euler circuit exists, and we
want to find it. There is a standard trick which shows that the decision problem is polynomial if the search
problem is polynomial:
Assume there is a polynomial algorithm A that solves the search version, and let its running time be n10,
say. To solve the decision problem, we apply A to an input. It either finds the right Euler circuit and then
the answer is YES, or it runs longer than n10, and then the answer is NO. 
In the donkey problem we assume that ωF has no accidental repeats. What the attacker gets? There
are two versions of the algorithm. Let us first consider the strong concealing where the preliminary step is
performed.
1. As described above, using the 4−repeats of length k − 1 of ωF , the attacker gets the cards of S
2+,
i.e. C1 ∪ C2, where
C1 = {o1Q
2
1r1Q
1
2, o2Q
2
2r2Q
1
3, . . . , omQ
2
mrmQ
1
1}
and
C2 = {o1Q
2
1r
′
1Q
1
pi(1), o2Q
2
2r
′
2Q
1
pi(2), . . . , omQ
2
mr
′
mQ
1
pi(m)}.
2. The attacker also gets each Q1i and each oiQ
2
i since these are exactly maximal initial and terminal
segments of the cards above which are repeated twice in ωF .
3. By matching the overlaps, the attacker gets each pair Q1iQ
2
i since the overlap oi in oiQ
2
i is a terminal
segment of Q1i and we may assume that these cannot be misinterpreted.
4. What the attacker gets from the initial applications of procedure S? Each of their overlaps (of length
k − 1) appears at least twice in the input of S1+. Moreover most of the cuts of the procedures S
are different. Let us recall here that among these overlaps may be also the dust. Procedures S1+
and S2 cut into some of these. Those cut will remain 2-repeats, those not cut may gain repeats.
Moreover, S1+ introduces dust in the border of each card: this adds 2-repeats of strings of length
k − 1 undistinguishable from the 2-repeats coming from initial procedures S.
In case weak concealing algorithm is applied, the attacker has 1., 2., 3. where Q2i ri and Q
2
i r
′
i are replaced
by P 2i and Q
1
i is replaced by P
1
i .
The next proposition summarises the possible types of repeats introduced by the algorithm.
Proposition 7.2. All the repeats of ωF generated by the weak or strong concealing algorithm are those
described in 1., 2., 3., 4..
Corollary 7.3. All the useful information for the attacker problem is |ω|, k, and 1., 2., 3., 4..
The information 1., 2., 3. may be described by the auxiliary bipartite graph G(pi) defined in Definition 4.1.
If the weak concealing algorithm is applied, information [4.] does not exist. The attacker problem is thus
reduced to the following:
The donkey-decision problem. The input is a bipartite graph G where the vertices in both parts
V1, V2 are ordered. Let V1 = {u1, . . . , um} and V2 = {v1, . . . , vm}. Moreover a segment s(v) of length at
least 3k/2 is associated with each element of V2. The set of the edges of G is formed by a disjoint union of
two perfect matchings M2,M3. The attacker needs to reconstruct string
s(M2(1))s(M2(2)) . . . s(M2(m)),
where M2(i) is the vertex of V2 connected with ui ∈ V1 by an edge of M2.
The difficulty of the donkey-decision problem is the following: bipartite graph G is a union of two edge-
disjoint perfect matchings. Each vertex of G thus has degree 2 and G is a union of disjoint cycles. To solve
the donkey-decision problem, one needs to choose the correct perfect matching independently in each of these
cycles (namely, the perfect matching induced by M2). This is impossible, and the list of all the possibilities
is almost always exponential in the number of the cycles, since each of the cycles has two perfect matchings.
This is analysed precisely below, when we speak about the feasible solutions.
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Next we argue that, when the strong concealing algorithm is applied, the attacker problem is reduced to
the donkey-decision problem too. The attacker is left with the statistics of the repeats of ωF . Here comes
the reason why we introduced the dust in S1+: it is to make sure that the 2-repeats appear symmetric for
both matchings M2,M3. This hides the repeats introduced by the initial applications of procedure S. The
information of [4.] is thus useless. We obtain:
Proposition 7.4. The attacker problem for both strong and weak concealing is reduced to the analysis of
the donkey-decision problem.
A feasible solution to the donkey-decision problem is any sequence s(M(1))s(M(2)) . . . s(M(m)), where
M is any perfect matching of the input bipartite graph G. In order to solve the donkey-decision problem,
one needs to choose, from the pool of these feasible solutions, the unique correct one. Next we argue that
unless the input to our problem is extremely restrictive, there is an exponential number of the competative
solutions.
The bipartite graphs G coming from A have at least 2m/c perfect matchings. The output sequences of
two perfect matchings M,N may still be equal: if the cycle has length 4, this happens if and only if the two
vertices vi, vj of V2 in each 4−cycle in which M,N differ have the same associated segment (s(vi) = s(vj)
as defined in Observation 4.4).
For instance, if all the vertices of V2 have the same associated segment, then there is only one competative
solution. This extreme situation may happen if the input ω is a sequence of repetitions of one symbol only.
If two symbols may appear in the segments (of length at least 3k/2) associated with the vertices of V2, then
the probability that in a 4-cycles the corresponding pairs of strings are indistinguishable is 2−3ka/2. Hence
with only exponentially small probability there is less than an exponential number of feasible solutions.
8. Conclusion
We define the information concealing problem and propose an algorithm to solve it. It is based on
the intuition coming from the difficulties of DNA reconstruction by hybridisation. The algorithm may be
efficiently implemented. In analysing the amount of information leaked by the concealing algorithm to an
attacker (this is called the attacker problem in the paper), we first consider the case that the output contains
random repeats; this leads to the domino problem which is shown to be NP-complete. Even if the attacker
solves the domino problem, she is faced with the donkey problem which is reduced to the donkey-decision
problem. It is shown that with high probability the donkey-decision problem has an exponential number of
feasible solutions among which the attacker needs to choose the correct one.
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